Subjective Equilibria under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty

We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses its decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a stochastic environment process driving the system is exogenous whereas in actuality this process is a solution of closed-loop dynamics affected by each individual player. Players observe past realizations of the environment variables and their local information. At equilibrium, if players are given the full distribution of the stochastic environment process as if it were an exogenous process, they would have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from their strategies. This notion thus generalizes what is known as the price-taking equilibrium in prior literature to a stochastic and dynamic setup. We establish existence of SEBEU, study various properties and present explicit solutions. We obtain the $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium property of SEBEU when there are many players

Cooperative Control and Potential Games

We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium

Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games

We consider repeated multiplayer games in which players repeatedly and simultaneously choose strategies from a finite set of available strategies according to some strategy adjustment process. We focus on the specific class of weakly acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for multiagent cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process determines how players select their strategies at any stage as a function of the information gathered over previous stages. Of particular interest are “payoff-based” processes in which, at any stage, players know only their own actions and (noise corrupted) payoffs from previous stages. In particular, players do not know the actions taken by other players and do not know the structural form of payoff functions. We introduce three different payoff-based processes for increasingly general scenarios and prove that, after a sufficiently large number of stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify player utility functions through tolls and incentives in so-called congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to guarantee that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a simulation of distributed routing over a network

Visual mining of science citation data for benchmarking scientific and technological competitiveness of world countries

In this paper we present a study where we visually analyzed science citation data to investigate the competitiveness of world countries in selected categories of science. The dataset that we worked on in our study includes the number of papers published and the number of citations made in the ESI (Essential Science Indicators) database in 2004. The dataset lists these values for practically every country in the world. In analyzing the data, we employ methods and software tools developed and used in the data mining and information visualization fields of the Computer Science. Some of the questions for which we look for answers in this study are the following: (a) Which countries are most competitive in the selected categories of science? (i.e. Engineering, Computer Science, Economics & Business) (b) What type of correlations exist between different categories of science? For example, do countries with many published papers in the field of Engineering science also have many papers published on Computer Science or Economics & Business? (c) Which countries produce the most influential papers? This analysis is needed since a country may have many papers published but these papers may be cited very rarely. (d) Can we gain useful and actionable insights by combining science citation data with socioeconomic and geographical data

COMMUNICATION OF MATLAB GUI AND ANSYS MAXWELL: AN EDUCATION TOOL FOR TUBULAR LINEAR GENERATOR

In this study, analytical calculations of a tubular linear generator model are performed by using Matlab Gui for free-piston applications. A training tool including the processes of design of linear generator, sizing with the analytical equations and analyzing with the finite elements methods was suggested. Geometric dimensions in Matlab Gui interface are solved by transferring automatically to finite element model Ansys-Maxwell 2D-rz plane. The results of analytical analysis are in concordance with the results of finite elements.  In addition, Ansys-Maxwell Script and Matlab codes are given in the appendix